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TheMarriage Game
Marco Li Calzi and M. Cristina Molinari
The happiness of amarried man depends on the people he has not
married.
Oscar Wilde
The marriage game is one of the world’s oldest games. One takes some men and
women (preferably unmarried) and lets them freely interact, hoping that they will
manage to find a partner and enter into a happy and lasting marriage.
Themarriage game happens to be one of themost difficult games to play, because
nobody knows its rules exactly. In spite of a training phase during adolescence, the
players need many years of experience and an enourmous emotional investment
before they can learn the fundamental rules of the game. The game can take a cruel
twist, especially for those who do not reach the final goal and end up as “bachelors”.
Moreover, it is only at the end of their lives that the players who getmarried and leave
the game find out whether they have won or not. Sometimes, chance or necessity
may put them back into the game against their will.
The same reasons that make the game so difficult to play probably explain the
fascination it exerts on those looking at it from the outside. Obviously, there are
different ways of playing the role of the observer. Readers of illustrated magazines
or fans of soap opera look at this game very differently fromwriters, artists or movie
directors, who find in the marriage game one of their main sources of inspiration.
The eye of the mathematician is particularly sensitive towards formal structures.
Thus, when mathematics observes the marriage game, it is more apt to remark the
characteristics that can be f rmalised in a model. For example, Gottman et al. []
show how to construct dynamical models to describe and predict the evolution of
a conversation between husband and wife. And Bearman et al. [] use a graph to de-
scribe the emotional and sexual relations between about  students at a secondary
school in a small town in the American Midwest.
 Translated by Sarah Wolf
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Let us try to look at the marriage game through the eyes of a mathematician: we
will construct a model (or better, a stylised version) of the marriage game and see
which properties emerge.
TheMarriage Game
There are nmen andmwomen. All of them have a preference ranking over the part-
ners of the other sex, based onwhich they are never perfectly indifferent between two
suitors. These people try to find their match within the group, or in a more roman-
tic language, to get married. Only strictly monogamous and heterosexual matchings
are admitted.
Let us consider an example with three men and four women. Brian, Charles and
David are the three men. Ann, Emma, Ingrid and Olivia are the four women. For
brevity, we often use simply the initial letters of the names to denote whowe are talk-
ing about. Note that the initials of the men are the first three consonants (B, C, D)
and those of the women are the first four vowels (A, E, I, O).
Suppose that Brian’s preference ranking has Ann before Emma before Ingrid
before Olivia. Brian would prefer to marry Ann, but he is also willing to take either
Emma or Ingrid as a wife. However, rather than marrying Olivia, he would prefer to
remain single. To represent this preference ranking, we use the notation:
Brian: A  E  I  
where “” indicates preference while the star “” denotes that from this position
onwards Brian prefers not to get married.
For our example, let us suppose that the preferences of the seven players are the
following:
Brian: A  E  I  
Charles: I  E  A  
David: A  I  E  O
Ann: C  D  B
Emma: B  C  D
Ingrid: D  C  B
Olivia: D  B  C
We are interested in describing which matchings can be expected to emerge. Ann,
for example, is the first choice for both Brian andDavid.Wewould like to know who
will manage to marry her, assuming that Ann does not succeed instead in marrying
Charles, her own first choice. Of course, in general the answer depends on the cir-
cumstances. In a society where older men prevail, Ann would probably end up as
the wife of whoever is older between Brian and David. In a society where women
prevail, Ann would perhaps manage to take Charles for a husband.
To be more specific, let us analyse a modern (and Western) version of the mar-
riage game where two fundamental rights have to be respected. The first one is that
everybody can elect to remain single: nobody can impose marriage upon anybody
u
n
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
e
d
p
r
o
o
f
TheMarriage Game

else. Therefore, if Charles does not want to marry Olivia (as his preferences state),
we are sure that the match between Charles and Olivia cannot take place. The sec-
ond right is that a married person can file for divorce should (s)he find a partner
whom (s)he likes better than the current one and who is willing to marry him (or
her). For example, if Ann is married to David, she can divorce him and get mar-
ried with Charles if the latter one wants to wed her. Of course, if Charles is already
legally committed to Ingrid (whom he prefers to Ann), Charles himself is not avail-
able.Therefore, Ann stays with David only if Charles is already married off to Ingrid
(or Emma).
Stable matchings are those pairings of people which respect these two funda-
mental rights of the individuals. In our example there are only two stable matchings:
. B–E, C–I, D–A, O single
. B–E, C–A, D–I, O single
Therefore, for this particular version of the marriage game, we expect one of these
two configurations to emerge at the end.
In general, depending on the number of people involved and on their prefer-
ence rankings, there can be few or many stable matchings. Our example had two;
however, even situations with a very small number of people can have a rather large
number of stablematchings. Example . in [] reports a situation devised byKnuth
where a marriage game with four men and four women admits ten different stable
matchings.
Mathematicians have found several properties that hold in general for our ver-
sion of themarriage game.Themonograph byRoth and Sotomayor [] collectsmany
of these results and provides proofs. Here we choose to quote only four of these.
The first result ensures that there always exists a stable matching, whatever the
number of players and their preference rankings. In other words, anymarriage game
has at least one solution. Stable matchings can be determined by examining the
possible configurations one by one to check whether they respect the two funda-
mental rights. This can be very time-consuming. In the next section we describe
a constructive algorithm by Gale and Shapley [] that finds one stable matching in
a very simple and direct way. The existence of a stable matching is thus a corollary
of the proposition that the Gale-Shapley algorithm always leads to a stable match-
ing.
The second theorem states that the stable matching need not be unique, as our
example also shows. In very many cases all we can do is to restrict the outcome of
the marriage game to the subset of configurations that are stable matchings, but we
are not able to foresee exactly which one is going to emerge. Luckily, not everything
is predetermined. In our example, we expect Charles to marry Ann or Ingrid but the
final outcome of the game is left to chance and to the ability of the players.
The third result says that a player who happens to stay single in a stable match-
ing must remain single in any other stable matching. In our example, Olivia stays
single in any stable matching. This theorem leaves no margin for regret: those who
find themselves “bachelors” in a stable matching would have remained single even
if things had gone differently. Perhaps this can be a source of consolation: after all,
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no matter how things would have gone, Olivia could not have succeeded in finding
a husband as part of a stable matching. Thus she has nothing to reproach herself
about when she remains single.
The fourth theorem requires some preparation. Let us go back to our example,
where there are just two stable matchings: [B–E, C–I, D–A, O single] and [B–E,
C–A, D–I, O single]. We call the former M and the latter F. Let us find out how
each of the men judges these two matchings.
Brian is indifferent, because he marries the same woman in both cases. Charles
prefers M to F, because in M he marries Ingrid who is his first choice. And David
prefersM to F aswell, because inM hemarriesAnnwho is his first choice.Therefore,
for each of the men, the matching M is better than (or at least indifferent to) the
matching F. The men unanimously prefer M to F.
The contrary happens for the women. Emma and Olivia are indifferent be-
tween M and F: the former marries the same man and the latter does not marry
anyone anyway. Ann prefers F to M, because she marries Charles who is her first
choice and Ingrid prefers F to M because she marries David who is her first choice.
In this case the women unanimously prefer F to M. (The initials F and M help to
remember which of the two sexes prefers the corresponding matching.)
Looking at the choice between M and F from the point of view of the two sexes,
there is an obvious conflict.Themen collectively preferM and, similarly, the women
collectively prefer F. Given that we started out from an example, this divergence in
the collective preferences might just be coincidence. However, the fourth theorem
states that this is an inevitable characteristic of the marriage game. If one of the sexes
collectively prefers a certain stable matching to another one, then the opposite sex
has an exactly contrary preference. In this case, the adage that men and women are
in perpetual conflict seems to have some foundation.
How to Find a StableMatching
There are many ways of finding a stable matching. The most natural one, and the
first that was proposed, is the algorithm of Gale and Shapley []. Its main character-
istic is to assign different tasks to the two sexes. The representatives of one sex have
the burden to propose matrimony and the representatives of the other sex have the
honour to accept it. For convenience in the following description, suppose it is the
men who propose and the women who accept. Later on, we will see what happens
when the roles are reversed.
The algorithm proceeds in stages. At the first stage, each man asks for the hand
of his first choice (if he has one). Every woman judges the proposals she may have
received and chooses whether to accept one of them or to remain single. If she ac-
cepts, she will become “engaged” to the proposing man; however, the engagement is
not definitive and can be broken in the subsequent stages.
At the next stage, every man who is not engaged asks for the hand of his next
best choice (if he has one). Every woman chooses between the proposals she may
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have received, her current fiancé and staying single. If she accepts a new proposal,
she breaks the previous engagement and announces a new one.
The algorithm is repeated until it reaches a state where all men are engaged or
the men who are still single have asked for the hand of all women they are willing to
marry. Since the maximum number of women that a man can propose to is m, the
algorithm must terminate after at most m iterations. At this point all engagements
are confirmed and the weddings will (possibly) be celebrated.
We can test the functioning of this algorithm in our example. At the first stage,
Brian andDavid both propose toAnn (whoprefersDavid and thus becomes engaged
to him) while Charles and Ingrid get engaged. At the second stage Brian – who is the
only man not yet engaged – proposes to Emma, who accepts. All men are engaged
and the algorithm terminates, producing configuration M as a stable matching.
Now, let us switch roles and have the women propose while the men accept. At
the first stage, Ann becomes engaged to Charles, Emma to Brian and Ingrid to David
(who declines Olivia’s proposal). In the two following stages, Olivia approaches first
Brian and then David, but is always rejected. At this point Olivia has proposed to all
men she is willing to marry, and the algorithm terminates, producing the configu-
ration F that is again a stable assigment.
Recall that men and women have opposite collective preferences over the stable
matchings. The men prefer M to F and the women vice versa. In our example, the
version of the algorithm where the men propose leads to the stable matching M;
symmetrically, the version where the women propose leads to the stable matching F.
This holds in general: among all stablematchings, this algorithmalways finds the one
that is collectively preferred by the sex to which the task of proposing is entrusted.
Of course, more complex algorithms that are capable of finding less extreme stable
matchings exist.
It is worth noting that the right to accept or decline a marriage offer is in fact
less advantageous than having tomake the offer.The reason is intuitively simple.The
one who makes the offer starts out from his first choice and proceeds downwards,
worsening his situation only when forced to. His role is active. The one who accepts
offers, on the other hand, has access only to the best partner knocking on his door,
but is not allowed to actively begin courting another partner that he considers to be
better. Thus, he has a passive role.
Let us make two observations. The first one is that if the two sexes were to debate
which version of the algorithm is preferable, the men would defend the first and the
women the second one. The conflict between the sexes would shift from collective
preferences over stable matchings to the choice of the method used to find one.
The second remark is of a more speculative nature. The version of the algorithm
where the men propose roughly recalls the prevailing way the marriage game used
to be organised in the Western world of the nineteenth century. Considering that
this way favours the men, might we say that part of the progress towards equality
between the sexes has been to teach the women of our century not to leave all the
initiative to men?
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A Pinch of Poligamy
One of the crucial assumptions of the marriage game is that the matchings are
monogamous. However, thinking of a version of the marriage game with a more
exotic flavour, we could imagine that each man might be allowed to marry up to
four women. What happens if we modify the marriage game allowing one of the
sexes to practice poligamy?
Things become quite a bit more interesting if we change subject and, instead of
men and women, speak about firms and workers or about universities and students:
usually a firm hires more than one worker, while each worker is an employee of
only one firm; similarly, a university admits various students, while each student is
enrolled at only one university. Thus we can view their relationships as a form of
marriage game in which one of the sides has the right to practice poligamy while the
other one does not.
Consider n universities and m students. Each university can accept the enroll-
ment of several students, possibly up to the number of positions that are available.
Each student can enrol at only one university. Universities need not accept all ap-
plications they receive and students are not obliged to enrol at a university. Every
student has a preference ranking over universities, based on which he is never indif-
ferent between two universities.
Universities have a preference ranking over students with no ties, that satisfies
also another assumption: the acceptance of a student by the university does not de-
pend on who has already been admitted. In formal terms, if a university considers
student x to be better than student y in a direct comparison, this remains true when
the university has already accepted the enrollment of some students and has to eval-
uate whether it now prefers taking x or y. This assumption excludes cases of affir-
mative action, where a student who is individually preferred ends up being rejected
because the school prefers to admit a student who is ranked worse but represents an
ethnic group or some other socially disadvantaged group. Our assumption imposes
that the evaluation of a student depends only on his intrinsic merits and does not
take into consideration also how many students of the different ethnic groups have
already been admitted.
Students and universities try to combine matchings amongst themselves, or in
a more bureaucratic language, to form the classes for the coming school year. This is
a form ofmarriage gamewhere unilateral poligamy is allowed for the universities. By
means of an appropriate transformation, this problem can be reduced to a marriage
game without poligamy. Therefore, many of the mathematical properties we have
seen persist in this model.
In particular, the following four theorems, which are analogous to those pre-
sented for the marriage game in the monogamous regime, hold:
– there always exists a stable matching;
– the stable matching need not be unique;
– if a student is not admitted to any university in some stable matching, he will not
be admitted to any university in any stablematching; furthermore, the number of
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available positions that a university succeeds in filling is the same in any stable
matching and, if the number of students is less than the number of available
positions, even the set of students that are accepted will be the same;
– universities and students have opposite collective preferences over the stable
matchings.
The algorithm of Gale and Shapley for finding a stable matching generalises in a nat-
ural way. As before, we need to assign to one side the task of proposing and to the
other one that of accepting. The side which proposes is favoured in the sense that
the algorithm generates its collectively preferred stable matching. Given that stu-
dents and colleges have opposite collective preferences, this again poses the problem
of choosing which side to entrust with the task of proposing. In this case, however,
the asymmetry between the poligamous side and the monogamous side suggests to
favour the latter, which appears weaker. In fact, traditionally, it is the students who
apply at a university or the workers who search for employment.
It is Not Just a Game
As in many other countries, US medical graduates have to do an internship (or res-
idency) with a hospital department. In the first decades of the twentieth century,
the competition between hospitals for the best interns and the competition between
graduates for the best internships had produced a climate in which the offers of in-
ternships were made too early. In the fourties, offers were often made at the begin-
ning of the third year of study, when there was not yet enough information on the
abilities and the preparation of the student. On their part, students had to accept or
reject an offer without knowing which other offers they could have received subse-
quently. All in all, the selection process for interns was chaotic.
Between  and  a serious attempt wasmade to establish a unique deadline
for accepting an offer, but the effort did not achieve lasting effects.The hospitals con-
tinued to impose very short deadlines constraining students to decide in the dark.
Hospitals, on their part, had to embark on complicated and troubling investigations
because, when a student declined an offer, it was often too late to make an offer to
the second choice. In  the chaos was tamed by adopting a centralised algorithm
for appointments, known as the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP, in
the following), as reported in Roth [].
The NRMP, which every year establishes the appointments of residents to hos-
pitals for the whole of the United States, is obviously of great importance. However,
although the algorithm worked rather well, nobody had a clear explanation of its
success.
In  Gale and Shapley [], without knowing the NRMP, described the mar-
riage game in the American Mathematical Monthly. In , Alvin Roth [] became
aware that the NRMP was substantially equivalent to the algorithm of Gale and
Shapley and rapidly understood the reason for its success: the problem of assign-
ing residents to hospitals is a version of the marriage game with unilateral poligamy.
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The centralised algorithm of the NRMP works very well because it produces stable
matchings.
This intuitionhas allowed to update theNRMP so as to take into account changes
in the characteristics of the participants. For example, one of the biggest problems
recently faced is that the number of couples of residents who look for two positions
in the same geographical area has increased in the course of time (cf. []). This is
a natural consequence of the evolution of customs. While in the fifties the typical
resident was single or married to a partner who was prepared to follow him, now it
is rather customary that medical students meet their partner while studying. Thus
couples are formed, who at the end of their studies wish to live together and therefore
look for two resident positions at hospitals in the same vicinity.
Applications of the marriage game do not end here. All over the world other cen-
tralised algorithms, similar to the NRMP, have been proposed or are effectively in
use, often inspired by the NRMP or the theoretical study of the marriage game and
the algorithm of Gale and Shapley []. Among the applications in which these al-
gorithms have been successful are: mechanisms analogous to the NRMP in Canada
and Great Britain; general rules for entering the legal profession in some provinces
in Canada; the National Panhellenic Conference in the US for assigning female stu-
dents to social organisations known as sororities, including housing assignment; the
market for the recruitment of football players in American university colleges.
Amongst themechanisms recommended to improve upon the existing situation,
wemention the proposal tomodify the systemof assigning students to universities in
Turkey, that already takes place in a centralised way on a national basis []. Another
recent and important proposal, however based on techniques that were created to
solve assignment problems different from themarriage game, suggests the establish-
ment of a centralisedmarket for kidney exchange betweenpatients on thewaiting list
for a transplant and donors [].This proposal has been approved in September 
by the Renal Transplant Oversight Committee of New England; it will most likely be
possible to judge its effectiveness soon.
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